In early
1995 I published Traditionalists, Infallibility and the Pope, a short, non-polemical
booklet setting forth the case for sedevacantism.[1]
An
explanation of the term “sedevacantism” may be in order. Traditional Catholics
have tried to explain in various ways how the errors and evils of the
officially-sanctioned Vatican II changes could come from what appears to be the
authority of an infallible Church. The sedevacantist position maintains that
the only coherent explanation for this state of affairs is to conclude that,
since error and evil cannot come from the authority of an indefectible and
infallible Church, the ecclesiastics who promulgated these changes — from pope
on down — at some point lost their office and authority through personal
heresy.[2]
The
last point may surprise many Catholics. But an impressive list of pre-Vatican
II theologians and canonists, as well as at least two popes (Innocent III and
Paul IV) admit the principle behind it: That a pope, in his personal capacity, can defect
from the faith or become a heretic. When the fact of his defection becomes manifest,
such a pope automatically (ipso facto)
loses his office and authority.
I
cited numerous passages on this point in Traditionalists,
Infallibility and the Pope. To my surprise, the booklet proved extremely
popular and continues to receive a wide distribution throughout the world.
In
October 1995 the Society of St. Pius X’s official U.S. publication, The Angelus, printed an article by Lazlo
Szijarto entitled “Pope-Sifting: Difficulties with Sedevacantism.”
Mr.
Szijarto wrote “Pope-Sifting”[3]
in response to my booklet. Since the Society has been promoting Mr. Szijarto’s
article as sort of a definitive refutation of my study, and since Mr. Szijarto
himself asked me to comment, a public reply is in order.
The
average layman who reads Mr. Szijarto’s article may find it impressive, or at
least intimidating. The main text is peppered with Latin quotes — and who’s a
simple layman to argue with Latin quotes? Grand-sounding general principles are
confidently asserted. The footnotes, complex sentences, high-toned words
(“criteriologically,” “ontologically”) and seemingly erudite quibbling (e.g.,
hand-wringing over how to translate “quoad
nos”) create an ambiance that the man in the pew associates with learned
intellectual discourse.
But
the layman should not be cowed by all this. Latin quotes, footnotes and
high-toned jargon are sometimes just camouflage for what, upon close examination,
turns out to be not simply a bad argument, but nonsense on stilts.
Mr.
Szijarto’s offenses are legion: he misrepresents opponents’ positions, piles up
utterly gratuitous assertions about various points of church law and ecclesiology,
mistranslates and misapplies his sources’ statements, provides inaccurate and
unverifiable citations,[4]
tosses in sanctimonious personal attacks, tries to tar all sedevacantists with
ridiculous opinions held by only a handful, and “puffs” (exaggerates) the
authority of an opinion held by the theologian John of St. Thomas.
Mr.
Szijarto’s capital sin is a series of principles which he enunciates at the
beginning of his article and which he makes the basis for his entire argument.
Mr. Szijarto has not only aimed these principles at a sedevacantist straw man
of his own devising, but also has created them on his own from an
out-of-context quote which he has both misapplied and mistranslated. This alone
is utterly fatal to the rest of Mr. Szijarto’s argument.
Since his article does, however, contain a number of other major errors, we will address four points here: (1) The false first principles Mr. Szijarto lays down about the “determination” that a pope has fallen from office. (2) His misapplication of the theologians’ teachings on “dogmatic facts.” (3) His manufacture of a non-existent conflict between sedevacantism and the doctrine of the Church’s indefectibility. (4) His puffing of John of St. Thomas.
In the first paragraph of his article, Mr. Szijarto concedes
that it is common teaching among theologians that a pope who defects from the
faith or becomes a heretic, once the fact becomes manifest, automatically loses
his office.[5]
He then adds:
Catholics, however, do not have the right to make
a determination on their own as to the fact of whether a deposition
has actually taken place in this manner.
Although manifest heresy would ontologically
effect deposition ipso facto, a
determination would have to be made by the Universal Church about that very
fact embodied in the expression ipso
facto — most probably through the declaration of a General Council — before
individual Catholics could arrive at such
a conclusion criteriologically.…
[The Church] would have to do so before Catholics
could make that determination for themselves. [His emphasis]
These assertions, so confidently delivered,
are hogwash.
A. The
“Determination” Straw Man
Mr.
Szijarto, first of all, has set up a straw man by applying an equivocal term —
“determination” — to two entirely different things, which he then falsely
equates: (1) an individual sedevacantist’s conclusion that the Holy See is vacant, and (2) a General
Council’s formal legal
declaration that the Holy See is
vacant.
It’s
a clever sleight-of-hand, but a fundamentally dishonest argument — particularly
so, given the pains I took at the end of my article to assure readers that a
firm personal conclusion about the vacancy of the Holy See was not, and could
not be, the same thing as an authoritative declaration from the Church.
B. Gratuitous
Assertions
The
first two of Mr. Szijarto’s statements quoted above are gratuitous. Where, for
instance, is the list of authorities who support his sweeping universal statement
that Catholics “have no right” to “determine” (i.e., conclude) that a
deposition has taken place? Where are all the canonists who have said with Mr.
Szijarto that a “determination” from the Universal Church would have to come
before an individual Catholic could arrive at the conclusion
“criteriologically”? — whatever that
means.
C. A
Misapplied Mistranslation
For
the third assertion quoted above, Mr. Szijarto cites the theologian Hervé in a
footnote, providing the Latin original and an English translation.
Even
at first glance, the Hervé quote in the footnote appears irrelevant to the
statement in Mr. Szijarto’s main text. Mr. Szijarto is speaking about who
supposedly makes “determinations.” Hervé, on the other hand, appears to be
addressing the canonical technicality of how an office illegitimately occupied
must first be officially declared vacant before proceeding to an election — apples
and oranges, in other words.
This
alone is bad enough. Comparing Mr. Szijarto’s translation to the Latin and
locating it in the original work, however, reveals that Mr. Szijarto has lifted
the quote out of context, misapplied it and then mistranslated it.
The
passage from Hervé is not, as Mr. Szijarto’s article implies, from a discussion
about who has the right to “determine” that a pope has fallen from office.
Rather it is from the theologian’s lengthy refutation of the arguments for
conciliarism — the heresy that a General Council of the Church is superior to a
pope.
The
context in Hervé’s work is as follows:[6]
(I) Refutation of the heretics’ general claim for conciliar superiority. (II)
Refutation of their misrepresentation of the Council of Constance. (III)
Whether a Council, independent of a pope, can determine anything about the person of a pope regarding: (1) his election, or
(2) his deposition.
Regarding
deposition, Hervé enunciates the general principle that a General Council can
in no way and for no reason depose a pope. In some detail, Hervé explains
specifically why a Council cannot do this on grounds of a pope’s (a) moral depravity,
(b) heresy or (c) doubtful election.
Regarding
heresy, Hervé recaps the standard teaching of theologians quoted in so many
sedevacantist tracts — by heresy a pope puts himself outside the Church, and ipso facto loses his office. Hervé then
returns to explain the role of a General Council in all this:
In that case, a Council (the Church) would have only the right to declare his see vacant so that the usual electors could safely
proceed to an election.
A General Council, in other words, can do no more vis-à-vis
a heretical pope than declare his see vacant. In context, Hervé offers this
statement as part of a refutation of conciliarism.
Mr.
Szijarto, however, mistranslates the Latin, and puts the “only” with the wrong
word,[7]
thus completely changing the meaning of the passage to the following:
In that case, only
a Council (the Church) would have
the right to declare his see vacant so that the usual electors could safely
proceed to an election.
There’s
a world of difference, obviously, between saying “only a Council” has the right
to declare the see vacant, and saying that a Council “would have only the
right” to declare it vacant.
The
starting point for Mr. Szijarto’s whole argument — “making determinations” — is
thus based on a mistranslation.
II. dogmatic facts
The second
principle Mr. Szijarto invokes
against sedevacantism concerns “dogmatic facts.”
Broadly
speaking, a dogmatic fact is some fact so closely connected with a dogma that
it is necessary for establishing or correctly explaining that dogma.[8]
Theologians
classify the legitimacy of a pope or a General Council among dogmatic facts,
because only a legitimate pope or council can establish a dogma.
Theologians
also teach that the Church is infallible when she has determined that a particular pope or
General Council are legitimate. If it were otherwise, dogmas would be
endangered.
To
question, for instance, the legitimacy of Pius IX would imperil the dogma of
the Immaculate Conception, which he solemnly defined. Similarly, to impugn the
legitimacy of the Council of Trent would undermine the dogmas it defined on the
Sacrifice of the Mass.
Mr.
Szijarto paints sedevacantism as running afoul of this. Infallibility about
dogmatic facts, he says, guarantees a pope’s legitimacy beforehand.
Sedevacantists reason backwards from a perceived “false” teaching to the
non-legitimacy of a pope, making it possible for one to impugn the legitimacy
of any pope, post- or pre-Vatican II. This renders any notion of
infallibility impossible.
A. Apples and
Oranges
Mr.
Szijarto here is guilty of what logicians call the fallacy of ignorantia elenchi — arguing against
apples when everyone else is talking about oranges.
His
argument assumes that sedevacantists predicate their position on retroactively
impugning the legitimacy of Paul VI’s election. This is not really the case.
Montini
may indeed have been legitimately elected pope; I myself have not seen any
truly convincing arguments to the contrary. For me, as for most sedevacantists,
the problems with Paul VI’s legitimacy do not so much concern his election as
his loss of office after election.
This
issue has nothing whatsoever to do with infallibility and dogmatic facts.
B. A Missing
Ingredient
Mr.
Szijarto quotes the following passage from Hervé in an attempt to drive home
his point about dogmatic facts:
What good would it be to profess the infallible
authority of Ecumenical Councils or Roman Pontiffs in the abstract if it were
permitted to entertain doubts about the legitimacy of any given Council or
Pontiff?[9]
Again
Mr. Szijarto is picking something out of context. Two sentences before the
foregoing passage, Hervé notes that a dogmatic fact concerning the legitimacy
of a council or a pope is “principally historical.”[10]
The Church’s infallibility in this respect precludes challenging the legitimacy
of past General Councils or pontificates that the Church has always accepted
as legitimate.
In
1965, for example, no Catholic could have claimed that Pius IX had been
illegitimately elected or that the Council of Trent had been illegitimately
convoked, and that the pronouncements of either were therefore somehow null.
The Church’s infallibility regarding these historical facts, connected as they
are with her dogmas, prevented any error about legitimacy.
But
the story in 1965 for Paul VI was different. While a dead pope can’t “lose”
legitimacy (i.e., lose his office) a living one most surely can. He does so if
he defects from the Catholic faith and that defection becomes manifest. This is
what sedevacantists maintain happened to Paul VI.
The
principle is, as Mr. Szijarto himself admitted, the common teaching of
theologians. Yet he complains sedevacantists apply it a posteriori (from after the fact). Of course we do — that’s how all the authorities say it’s supposed to
work.
If
Mr. Szijarto thinks that the principle of automatic loss of office for heresy
somehow undermines the Church’s infallibility regarding dogmatic facts, his
quarrel is not with sedevacantists, but with the big-gun canonists and
theologians such as St. Antoninus, St. Robert Bellarmine, St. Alphonsus,
Wilhelm, Badii, Prümmer, Wernz-Vidal, Beste, Vermeersch-Creusen, Maroto,
Coronata and Regatillo.[11]
All we sedevacantists do is apply their teachings to Paul VI.
C. Crossed-Out
Popes
Based
on his faulty understanding of the nature of a dogmatic fact, Mr. Szijarto
argues that sedevacantism makes it possible to impugn the legitimacy of any pope in
history (e.g., Pius XII, Pius XI, Benedict XV, Pius IX, even St. Peter), not
just the post-Vatican II ones.
But
since the dogmatic fact of legitimacy is (as we have seen) principally historical,
the position of Pius XII and his predecessors is unassailable. At the same
time, the Church’s infallibility regarding the legitimacy of past popes does
not preclude one from maintaining that a living pope has fallen from office —
as sedevacantists did during the time of Paul VI.
On
the positive side, Mr. Szijarto’s error at least made for some amusing graphics[12]
in the terminally somber Angelus,
where most of the humor tends to be unintentional.
D. Which Dogma
is in Peril?
One
reason why the Church is infallible with dogmatic facts touching upon
legitimacy is, as we have said, that Catholic dogmas would be imperiled otherwise.
What
“Catholic dogmas” proclaimed by Paul VI and John Paul II are imperiled by
impugning their legitimacy? That non-Catholic sects are means of salvation?
That all men are saved? That liberty of conscience is divinely revealed?
It
would be interesting to hear the answer. Mr. Szijarto?
The third
principle Mr. Szijarto appeals to is
the indefectibility of the Church.
His
argument runs as follows: Only the universal Church can make infallible
judgments about a pope’s legitimacy. A doubtful pope would be no pope only if
the whole Church seceded from him.
Sedevacantism poses serious difficulties for the Church’s indefectibility,
which prevents the whole Church from either adhering to a false one or rejecting
a true one. The Church enjoys infallibility with regard to the legitimacy of a
pope. This leaves two alternatives: Either the Vatican II popes are legitimate
or the Catholic Church resides only in sedevacantist groups.
A. Two Contradictory Principles
Mr.
Szijarto’s argument contains two propositions which implicitly contradict each
other:
1.
Only if the whole Church secedes from
a pope is he a false pope. (= All must reject him.)
2.
The whole Church cannot adhere to a
false pope. (= Part can reject him, part can accept him.)
The
first proposition implies that part
of the Church cannot continue to adhere to someone who is a false
pope; the second implies that part of the Church can.
Both
propositions obviously cannot be true. The origin of this contradiction in Mr.
Szijarto’s argument can be traced to…
B. More
Misapplied Quotes
The
nexus of any discussion about sedevacantism is the issue of a heretical
pope: Is such a thing possible? If so, what principles apply? Could Paul VI or
John Paul be classified as such? etc.
But
Mr. Szijarto, once again, offers quotes about apples to refute arguments about
oranges.
Looking
up the context of Mr. Szijarto’s first two quotes (from Franzelin and Hervé)
reveals that the authors are dealing not with the topic of a heretical pope
(papa haereticus), but rather with
that of a doubtful pope (papa
dubius) — issues the ecclesiology textbooks treat separately.
In
both cases the authors are discussing schism, specifically the Great Western
Schism (ca. 1378–1417), when several rival popes, each supported by his own
faction, tried to claim the throne of Peter. The “doubt” did not concern the
claimants’ personal orthodoxy, but the canonical issue of which of them was in
fact the successor of Peter.
In
the paragraph immediately preceding the passage Mr. Szijarto quotes, both
Franzelin and Hervé do discuss the question of a heretical pope. Both admit that a heretical pope loses his
office.[13]
Mr.
Szijarto’s third quote cannot be verified (the second instance of this) because
he provides an inaccurate citation.[14]
In any event, since the quote appears to be dealing with dogmatic facts, it is
(based on what we have said in section II) likewise irrelevant to the discussion.
C. False
Alternatives
At
the end of his section on indefectibility, Mr. Szijarto presents two
alternatives as his conclusion: Either the Vatican II popes are legitimate or
the Catholic Church resides only in sedevacantist groups.
Since
Mr. Szijarto has based these alternatives on contradictory principles and
irrelevant citations, the choice he has constructed is completely false.
The fourth
main section of Mr. Szijarto’s
article is devoted to reproducing passages from the Spanish Dominican
theologian John of St. Thomas (1589–1644).
The
excerpts Mr. Szijarto quotes propose in essence that a heretical pope
juridically remains head of the Church until a General Council declares the
fact of his heresy. Until then, all the acts of such a pope are valid.
Mr.
Szijarto praises this to the heavens. John of St. Thomas has dealt with the
issue “brilliantly” and “ingeniously.” Thus, says Mr. Szijarto, “ontologically
manifest” reality is reconciled with “juridically visible reality, i.e.,
criteriologically manifest — manifest in the true sense of the term.”(?)
A. An
Abandoned Position
In
Appendix 1 of Traditionalists, Infallibility
and the Pope, I reproduced quotes from twelve canonists and theologians who
taught that a manifestly heretical pope automatically falls from office.[15]
Six of them further specified that this loss of office takes place without the
need for any declaration or sentence. This authors characterize as “the common
opinion” or even “the more common opinion.”
In
his treatment of John of St. Thomas, Mr. Szijarto is merely promoting a
minority opinion which later writers subsequently abandoned. It is absurd for
him to portray it as a master-stroke which destroys the sedevacantist position.
If canonists rejected, abandoned or ignored the position there must have been a
reason.
It
is possible that an explanation for this may be found in the two following
points.
B. A Papal Law
Contradicted
In
1559, in order to preclude the possibility of a heretic usurping the throne of
Peter, Pope Paul IV issued the Bull Cum
ex Apostolatus Officio. Paul IV decreed that if anyone elected pope had
beforehand deviated from the Catholic faith or fallen into any heresy, among
other things, his election would be invalid, his appointments would be invalid,
and he would automatically lose his office without
the need to make any further declaration. (I reproduced the pertinent passages in my booklet.)
The
opinion of John of St. Thomas that a declaration is needed before a pope loses office, obviously,
cannot be defended in the face of a papal law which decreed emphatically and
repeatedly that such a declaration is not
required.
C. A Juridical
Absurdity
While
it may have been justifiable for John of St. Thomas to propose his solution
under some provision of church law in force in the 17th century, it would be
neither reasonable nor possible to propose it now.
Both
the 1917 Code of Canon Law[16]
and John Paul II’s 1983 Code[17]
(which I assume Mr. Szijarto accepts) specify that only
the Pope can convoke a General (Ecumenical) Council. Under both codes, moreover, the pope sets the
agenda, can dissolve the Council, and must
confirm and promulgate its decrees
for them to have binding force.
If
one were to insist (as Mr. Szijarto does) that a heretical pope loses office
only after a General Council declares him to be such, the
law would require, to effect his deposition, that the heretical pope convoke a
Council against himself, place the issue of his own deposition on the agenda,
and then confirm and promulgate the Council’s decrees declaring his own
deposition.
This
sort of cooperation would probably be too much to expect, even in the age of
ecumenism.
The
application of the principle Mr. Szijarto puts forward thus results in a juridical
absurdity.
• • •
• •
Mr.
Szijarto, like many an apologist for
the Society of St. Pius X’s current position, deals with sedevacantism by
distorting it and then attempting to refute the distortion. We have identified
four main problems in his particular critique:
1.
The underlying principle for Mr. Szijarto’s argument (regarding
“determination”) is aimed at a straw man, and is based on a passage that Mr.
Szijarto has both misapplied and mistranslated.
2.
Mr. Szijarto misrepresents the nature of the “dogmatic fact” of legitimacy.
3.
Mr. Szijarto bases his arguments regarding indefectibility upon quotes which in
their original context refer to a doubtful
pope, an issue irrelevant to a discussion of sedevacantism, which principally
concerns the possibility of a heretical pope.
4.
The opinion of John of St. Thomas, so highly praised by Mr. Szijarto, is an
abandoned or (at best) minority position, which contradicts legislation
solemnly promulgated in a papal bull, and which would produce the juridical
absurdity of a heretical pope convoking a council against himself.
When I was a
seminarian in Ecône, I heard Archbishop Lefebvre say many times that Paul VI’s
New Mass was a “spiritual poison that destroys the Catholic faith” — a
proposition virtually all traditional Catholics would accept. But the authority
of Christ’s Church, infallible in promulgating universal disciplinary laws, cannot give a
rite which destroys the faith. The only way to reconcile infallibility with such
soul-destroying evil is to conclude that those who perpetrated it at some point
defected from the faith, lost their authority before God, and hence were no
popes at all.
(Sacerdotium 16, Spring 1996).
[1] Single copies are available free
from St. Gertrude the Great Church, 11144 Reading Rd., Cincinnati OH 45241.
[2] The term “sedevacantist” comes
from the Latin phrase sede vacante,
the technical term for interregnum between popes when the papal see is vacant.
In English, it is generally pronounced: say-day-va-CAHN-tist.
[3] The curious title is a dig at
sedevacantists, who objected to the St. Pius X Society’s stated policy of
“sifting” all the words and deeds of Paul VI and his successors, and then
obeying only what the Society’s superiors decided was “in accord with
tradition.”
[4] E.g., footnote 10 cites to
Hervé, Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae (1943)
I.514, where the passage Mr. Szijarto quoted is nowhere to be found.
[5] The editors of The Angelus,
it should be noted, excised this concession when they printed Mr. Szijarto’s
article, probably because it undercuts the Society’s party line. His original
begins: “Theologians commonly hold…”
The edited version begins: “Some
theologians hold…”
[6] See Hervé, I.498–501.
[7] The Latin, Hervé I.501, reads as
follows: “Tunc Concilium [Ecclesia] ius tantum haberet sedem vacantem
declarandi, ut ad electionem tuto procedere possent consueti electores.” The tantum (only, merely) modifies the verb haberet (would have). If the passage
meant what Mr. Szijarto claims it does, the tantum
would be next to Concilium (a
Council), and would begin: “Tunc Concilium
tantum [Ecclesia] jus haberet…”
[8] Various theologians give
slightly different definitions for the term.
[9] Citing Hervé, I.514.
[10] Hervé I.514: “Factum autem istud triplex
distingui potest: 1) principaliter historicum,
quo agnoscitur regula fidei, v.g., legitimitas concilii alicujus oecumenici aut
Pontificis :… De duobus ultimis tantum loquimur in praesenti, cum infallibilitas
Ecclesiae circa primum sponte defluat ex supradictis de concilio, de Pontifice
et de ipsa Ecclesiae indefectibilitate.” His emphasis.
[11] For which, see my original
article.
[12] A picture chart of the popes with
some crossed out.
[13] J.B. Franzelin, De Ecclesia Christi (1907), 231: “…vel
spontanea defectione ab Ecclesia per manifestam et contumacem haeresim…”
Franzelin adds that doubting whether, due to Christ’s promises, this could
actually ever come about is “not without reason.” Mr. Szijarto reproduced the
quote from Hervé I.501 in the passage he mistranslated.
[14] Footnote 13 cites to A.
Tanquerey Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae
(1921) I.84, where the passage quoted
is nowhere to be found.
[15] Some even though they thought it
unlikely that God would ever permit such a thing to happen.
[16] See Canon 222ff.
[17] See Canon 338ff.